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This article is an excerpt from E-IR’s free-to-download Edited 
Collection, Restoring Indigenous Self Determination. View all of 
E-IR’s Publications here. 
Using sovereignty as a shield, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) has generally sought a pass in regard to enforcing 
international human rights compliance. Though it has signed 
numerous human rights treaties, its state-centered approach has 
sought to avoid all efforts at enforcement. This avoidance has 
nowhere been more absolute than its disavowal of any obligations 
regarding indigenous peoples’ rights. The PRC actually voted in 
support of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (UN General Assembly 2008). It 
then promptly disavowed any obligation under the declaration, 
proclaiming there were no indigenous peoples in China. It 
proclaimed 5,000 years of unity and harmony with its 55 
designated national minorities living in peace on their own land. 
Though a bloody history and recent protests by the most prominent 
of these minorities – Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols – would 
tend to belie such assertion, the international community has rarely 
challenged this claim. 
PRC protestations aside, a reasonable case can be made that China 
does have indigenous peoples among the peoples it has formally 
identified as national minorities. Narrowing the focus to Tibet, this 
paper will assess China’s claims of exception from indigenous 
obligations and evaluate, on a general level, compliance with 
relevant international standards. This analysis appreciates that a 
mere UN declaration is usually not considered hard international 
law, though it may, under some circumstances, reflect customary 
international law. At a minimum, the UNDRIP, which sought to 
reflect existing customary international law, may be judged to offer 
a compelling guideline that China itself effectively embraced with 
its supporting vote. 
The UN Declaration and China 
While the UNDRIP does not offer a specific definition of 
“indigenous peoples,” it does specify that they exist throughout the 
world.[1] A 1986 UN study offered a definition seeking to include 
“communities... which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing” (UN Economic 
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and Social Council 1986). The emphasis on distinctive self-
identification clearly applies in this case. Even by China’s own 
account, in its 2009 White Paper on Tibet, the Tibetan people are 
clearly recognized as having a distinctive culture, language, and 
history, and constitute the vast majority in Tibetan areas (People’s 
Republic of China 2009). The invasion mentioned in the definition 
is likewise evident in the 1950-51 Chinese invasion of Tibet, 
which resulted in the Seventeen Point Agreement[2] with the Dalai 
Lama, promising Tibetans the right to continue under their 
traditional governance in exchange for acceptance of Chinese 
sovereignty.[3] That this agreement was clearly an unequal 
agreement that the Dalai Lama could hardly refuse is another 
feature it shares with similar indigenous agreements around the 
world. 
The UNDRIP identifies a number of standards that could 
appropriately be applied to assess prevailing conditions in Tibet. 
Its preliminary articles emphasize demilitarization of indigenous 
lands; the right of indigenous people to freely determine their 
relationship with states; that treaties, agreements, and constructive 
arrangements with states are matters of international concern; “the 
fundamental importance of the right of self-determination of all 
peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”; and that the right to exercise self- determination in 
conformity with international law shall not be denied. That Tibet is 
heavily militarized, and that the Tibetan people have never been 
allowed to make a free choice in determining their association with 
PRC, is widely appreciated. Efforts by the exiled Tibetan 
leadership to negotiate agreement concerning these issues have 
been consistently rebuffed. International concern over these 
matters has been the subject of numerous non-governmental 
organization, national, and international reports. 
The UN Declaration, in its main text, guarantees indigenous 
peoples the right of self-determination; the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs; the right to manifest, practice, develop, and teach their 
spiritual and religious traditions, customs, and ceremonies, 
including private access to their religious and cultural sites and 
control of their ceremonial objects; the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, 
through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with 
their own procedures; the right to be consulted and given prior 
consent through their own representative institutions before 
implementing state legislative and administrative measures; and 
the right to recognition, observance, and enforcement of treaties, 
agreements, and other constructive arrangements.[4] At the same 
time, they are guaranteed the rights protected by various human 
rights treaties and covenants. China’s nationwide imposition of 
top-down authoritarian rule, its dismissive responses to Tibetan 
efforts at negotiation, and its weak general protection of basic 
human rights clearly fail to meet these standards. A closer look in 
the following section shows just how far China has strayed from 
these standards and even its own earlier commitments reflected in 
the Seventeen Point Agreement. 
Tibetan “Autonomy” Under PRC Rule 
The Seventeen Point Agreement that China imposed on Tibet 
when it occupied the country in 1950-51 actually came closer than 
any subsequent policies to the standards of the UNDRIP. The 
agreement acknowledged Tibet’s special status, promised 
autonomy, and upheld Tibet’s traditional system of self-rule. 
Chinese officials in the revolutionary zeal of the 1950s, however, 
showed little regard for these commitments, as they sought to 
impose “democratic reform” under Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) rule, which they imagined Tibetans would quickly embrace. 
Chaffing under such an invasive approach, popular rebellion 
ensued and the Dalai Lama fled to India in March of 1959. There 
he established a government in exile that persists to the present 
(Dalai Lama 1991). If the Dalai Lama had stayed in Tibet, it seems 
likely that the Tibetan people and the world at large would have 
ultimately been deprived of one of the world’s leading spiritual 
leaders.[5] 
After the Dalai Lama fled into exile, PRC leaders abandoned their 
commitments under the Seventeen Point Agreement and 
established the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) where, under 
the current Law on National Regional Autonomy (LRNA), central 
control clearly outweighs any notion of autonomy (China 1984 
[2001]). About half of the contiguous traditional Tibetan areas 
have been distributed across 12 lesser 
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autonomous areas in adjoining provinces, in what looks to Tibetans 
like a divide-and-conquer strategy. The large military presence, 
especially in the TAR, suggests the PRC views Tibet more in terms 
of national security than indigenous rights. The LRNA applies to 
all 55 designated national minorities, but the heavy- handed direct 
control practiced under its provisions seems targeted mostly at 
Tibet and the Uyghur areas in neighboring Xinjiang. A suspicious 
mind may wonder whether the generous designation of so many 
national minorities aims to water down such quasi-indigenous 
status. 
The 1982 PRC Constitution, passed after the Cultural Revolution 
during China’s liberalizing phase, appears to offer local autonomy. 
Article 4 provides that “Regional autonomy is practiced in areas 
where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated 
communities” (China 1982). As is replicated in the LRNA, such 
autonomy includes the power to enact “regulations on the exercise 
of autonomy (zizhi tiaoli) and other separate regulations (danxing 
tiaoli) in light of the political, economic and cultural 
characteristics.” (China 1982;1984).[6] “Regulations on the 
exercise of autonomy” are effectively a sub-constitution or basic 
law, and one such law would be enacted in each region. A 
difficulty has been the requirement of higher approval for all such 
laws enacted in autonomous regions. Such approval must typically 
come from the next higher level of government: for autonomous 
regions, the central government, and for autonomous prefectures 
and counties, the provincial government. None of the PRC’s five 
autonomous regions – being Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Guangxi, and Ningxia – have received approval for such basic 
regulation on the exercise of autonomy. The attempt to enact a 
basic regulation in the TAR went through 15 drafts and was 
eventually abandoned without being submitted to the State Council 
(Ghai and Woodman 2009). Autonomous prefectures and counties 
have received approval from provincial governments for basic 
autonomy laws, but these simply track the LRNA content, showing 
little evidence of local autonomy. Autonomous regions and other 
areas have enacted many “separate regulations.”[7] A third 
category would be ordinary laws unrelated to autonomy, which do 
not require such higher approval. 
The picture that emerges is one of strict central control. Beyond the 
official approval required for enactment of autonomous laws, this 
control is most substantially exercised through CCP oversight at all 
levels. CCP committees are required to approve draft legislation at 
every step in the legislative process (Xia 2009). Other factors that 
facilitate this careful control of political choice in such minority 
autonomous regions include the replication of national political 
structures, such as people’s congresses and CCP oversight at all 
levels of autonomous government; the reality that Chinese cadres 
always hold the top CCP position in the regions; and, finally, a 
communist ideology that claims Chinese “liberation” of the area 
and effectively denies the indigenous reality of such regions. 
The outcome has been decades of Chinese domination and 
repression in Tibetan regions. During periods of national political 
chaos and repression, such as the Cultural Revolution, the level of 
destruction has been palpable, breeding high levels of Tibetan 
resentment. While recent years have seen Chinese policy 
encourage economic development, these moves have not been met 
with the hoped-for Tibetan gratitude. Tibetans have tended to see 
these policies as self-serving efforts to facilitate resource 
extraction, open up Chinese migration into Tibetan areas, and 
repress opposition – all favoring Chinese interests. Repressive 
efforts that have included close monitoring and “reeducation” in 
Tibetan monasteries, and a strong presence of security forces have 
bred even more resentment. Tibetan opposition has been manifest 
in various protests and even riots, and, most recently, in over 120 
self-immolations (Davis 2012). Any pretext of carrying out the 
original promise of the Seventeen Point Agreement, or even 
current national minority laws, has largely evaporated. Current 
policies fall far short of the promise of the UNDRIP. 
The Tibetan Memorandum and the Failure of Negotiation 
The demonstrations and riots in 2008 came at a particularly 
inopportune time for the PRC, as it prepared to host the 2008 
Olympics. Efforts at damage control led to three critical meetings 
straddling the Beijing Olympics in May, July, and October of 
2008. For years the Dalai Lama had advocated what he labeled a 
“middle way” approach to achieving genuine autonomy for Tibet, 
an approach he urged could fit under the 
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PRC Constitution (Central Tibetan Administration 2006). With the 
Beijing Olympics approaching, in the July 2008 meeting, Chinese 
officials asked the Dalai Lama’s representatives to submit a 
memorandum indicating how their middle way approach would fit 
under the PRC Constitution. The Tibetan Memorandum on 
Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People was submitted to 
Chinese officials at the October 2008 meeting, which followed 
closely on the heels of the Beijing Olympics (Central Tibetan 
Administration 2008).[8] 
The Tibetan memorandum outlined areas of hoped-for autonomy 
in eleven policy areas that largely tracked the autonomy areas 
identified in the PRC Constitution: language, culture, religion, 
education, environmental protection, utilization of natural 
resources, economic development and trade, public health, internal 
public security, population migration, and cultural, educational, 
and religious exchanges with other countries. In seeking local 
control over immigration and external relations in the commercial 
and cultural areas, the memorandum appeared to track the 
somewhat more robust autonomy afforded to Hong Kong and 
Macau under Article 31 of the PRC Constitution (China 1982). 
The memorandum also sought to avoid the central government 
approval process required under existing national minority laws. 
Finally, the memorandum sought to unify all contiguous Tibetan 
autonomous areas into one. All of these areas easily track the 
guidelines in the UNDRIP. 
The official Chinese response to Tibetan overtures and the 
Memorandum clearly signaled the PRC’s dismissal of the 
UNDRIP requirement of negotiating with freely chosen 
representatives of indigenous peoples. PRC officials promptly 
downgraded the discussions, indicating Sino-Tibetan “contacts and 
dialogues were about the Dalai Lama’s personal future, and not so-
called ‘China-Tibet negotiation’ or ‘dialogue between Han and 
Tibetan people’” (Xinhua, 6 July 2008). The PRC’s official aim 
was clearly damage control, as it insisted on three “stops” to “stop 
activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting 
violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic 
Games” (Xinhua, 6 July 2008). This was later refined to “four non-
supports”: “not to support activities to disturb the upcoming 
Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent 
criminal activities, not to support and concretely curb the violent 
terrorist activities of the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress’ and not to 
support any argument and activity to seek ‘Tibet independence’ 
and split the region from the country” (Xinhua, 6 July 2008). 
Chinese officials dismissively challenged the Dalai Lama’s 
credentials to represent the Tibetan people, insisting that he must 
speak to the central government as a “common person” (Indo-
Asian News Service 15 July 2008). They launched vociferous 
personal attacks, labeling the Dalai Lama a “wolf in monk’s robes” 
(Davis 2008). 
Responding directly to the Tibetan Memorandum, a State Council 
Address likened the Tibetan notion of “genuine autonomy” to the 
“high degree of autonomy” allowed Hong Kong.[9] The Tibetans 
were accused of seeking “half-independence” and “covert 
independence,” though no explanation is given why the same 
language applied to Hong Kong means only autonomy. The State 
Council Address further accuses the exiled Tibetans of “colluding 
with such dregs as ‘democracy activists’, ‘falunkun (Falungong) 
elements’ and ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorists.’” The Tibetan 
Memorandum’s proposal to gain control over immigration into 
Tibet is likened to “ethnic cleansing.” The State Council Address 
declared, “We never discussed the so-called ‘Tibet issue’ and will 
‘never make a concession.’” This language suggests the most 
extreme rejection of basic indigenous rights and associated 
autonomy for Tibetans. 
Conclusion 
Chinese officials responsible for Tibet policy, primarily in the PRC 
United Front Works Department, appear to see Tibet primarily as a 
security problem. Their views seem similar to historical colonialist 
policies, including a sense that they are bringing a superior culture 
and economic development to the region. One frequently hears 
Chinese expressions of concern about Tibetan ingratitude for 
generous Chinese investment in Tibetan areas. When this view is 
combined with Chinese claims of historical title to Tibet, Chinese 
outrage at the Tibetan challenge has left little room for 
compromise. The Dalai Lama, while offering compromise, has 
refused to bow to Chinese interpretations of Sino-Tibetan history. 
Chinese 
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officials may conclude that such refusal will deprive any 
settlement of full legitimacy. 
Confronted with the difficult reality of Chinese occupation, the 
Dalai Lama, as reflected in the Tibetan Memorandum, has offered 
to accept “genuine autonomy” under Chinese sovereignty. Chinese 
distrust of his representations, in the Memorandum and elsewhere, 
has left an impasse. The Dalai Lama has persisted in his efforts to 
reach compromise under his middle way approach, though 
skepticism about any breakthrough abounds. With his reservoir of 
support in the Tibetan community, Tibetans in exile have generally 
supported the Dalai Lama’s efforts, though skepticism is growing 
within the Tibetan exile community. There is very little trust that 
the Chinese have any interest in compromise, the perception being 
that they are just biding their time, awaiting a post-Dalai Lama 
period when they expect the Tibetan exile movement to collapse. 
The question to be asked is whether the Chinese are squandering 
the opportunity offered by the Dalai Lama, personally, and the 
Tibetan Memorandum, as a negotiating document, to reach a 
compromise. Should they take advantage of the Dalai Lama’s 
ability to garner support in the Tibetan community for any 
agreement reached in line with international standards and the 
Tibetan Memorandum? Until their policies begin to measure up to 
international standards, such as reflected in the UNDRIP, their 
claims regarding Tibet and other critical minority areas will 
continue to meet global skepticism, even while their power has 
garnered formal recognition of their sovereignty over Tibet. Given 
the visibility of this issue in nearly every Chinese foreign policy 
outing, the price paid for these poorly conceived policies surely 
stretches beyond Tibet to skepticism in general about China’s rise. 
Until the PRC acknowledges its international obligations, the 
deplorable human rights situation in Tibet seems destined to 
continue, as will a festering political sore covering nearly one-
quarter of contemporary Chinese territory. 
Notes 
[1] At the time of the Declaration there was thought to be over 370 
million indigenous people worldwide (International Herald 
Tribune 13 September 2007). 
[2] The full title is the “Agreement of the Central People’s 
Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for 
the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” which was signed on 23 May 
1951. 
[3] The title of the agreement appears to suggest that China was 
just reclaiming an historical possession, but Tibetan resistance and 
numerous scholarly historical assessments call this into question 
(see Smith, Jr. 1996; Crossley 1999; Sperling 2004). In the present 
worldview, one might expect the efforts of one nationality to claim 
ownership over another nationality with its own distinctive culture 
and identity to be viewed with skepticism (see Davis 2012). 
[4] See UNDRIP Articles 3, 4, 12, 18, and 19 (UN General 
Assembly 2008). 
[5] The 10th Panchen Lama, the second highest Tibetan spiritual 
leader, who stayed behind to support Chinese rule wound up 
spending nearly two decades in prison or under house arrest and 
eventually died at age 51. His successor designated by the Dalai 
Lama disappeared as a child and has not reappeared since. 
[6] Such provision is repeated in Article 66 of the Legislative Law 
of China. 
[7] Separate regulations are made by autonomous legislative 
bodies on specific topics, such as language, marriage, family 
planning, and so on. 
[8] After Beijing responded to the Memorandum, the exiled 
government published a separate response note (see Central 
Tibetan Administration 2010). 
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[9] Address at the Press Conference by the State Council Office, 
Beijing, 10 November 2008 (address given by Mr. Zhu Weiqun, 
Executive Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of 
the CPC Central Committee). The United Front Work Department 
is responsible for national minority affairs. 
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